Stepping stone attacks are often used by network intruders to hide their identities. To detect and block stepping stone attacks, a stepping stone detection scheme should be able to correctly identify a stepping-stone in a very short time and in real-time. However, the majority of past research has failed to indicate how long or how many packets it takes for the monitor to detect a stepping stone. In this paper, we propose a novel quick-response real-time stepping stones detection scheme which is based on packet delay properties. Our experiments show that it can identify a stepping stone within 20 seconds which includes false positives and false negatives of less than 3%.
Introduction
Internet attacks have increased significantly. One of the most important reasons for this is the ability of attackers to easily hide their identities and evade punishment by relaying their attacks through stepping stones. Through using this technique, an attacker is able to construct a chain of interactive connections on a series of compromised hosts (stepping stones) using protocols such as Telnet or SSH. The attacker's commands on their local machine are relayed via the chain of stepping stones until they finally reach the victim. Because the final victim only sees traffic from the last hop of the chain of the stepping stones, it is difficult for the victim to learn of any information about the true origin of the attack.
However it is possible to observe a certain correlation between the interactive connections in the chain of the stepping stones, such as the identical payload or similar packet timings. Therefore, one can detect stepping stones in a network by searching for such correlations between interactive connections at the network borders or routers. If a pair of interactive connections is detected as part of a steppingstone chain, they can be blocked immediately to stop the attack, thereby preventing further harm. Or, one can compile them to possibly trace-back stepping stone paths and identify the source of an attack.
To detect and block ongoing attacks, a stepping stone detection approach should be able to correctly, and quickly identify correlated interactive connections in real-time, because many attackers launch their attacks in a very short period of time to evade detection. It also means the quicker the response, the less harm that will be done. To trace-back and identify the source of an attack, real-time and quick-response is also necessary because attackers may have many techniques (such as fake IP addresses) to deny their attacking activity without spot evidence. Besides being responsive, a real-time steppingstone detection approach should be robust enough to resist any network imperfections (such as packet merges, packet drops, packet retransmissions) as well.
Since the problem of detecting stepping stones was first discovered by Staniford-Chen and Heberlein [1] , many approaches have been suggested to detect stepping stones in encrypted traffic. However, some previous approaches can not be used in real-time. For those stepping stone detection approaches that can be used in real time, only a few indicate how long or how many packets it takes for the monitor to detect a stepping stone. The Inter Packet Delay (IPD) approach [4] proposed by Wang et al. is the only one which takes responsiveness into consideration. Wang et al. claim their IPD approach only requires a few dozen packets (still nearly 100 seconds or more) for correlation. Their approach is not so resistant to network imperfections, such as packet merges, packet drops and packet retransmissions which may change the IPD characteristics. Blum et al. [6] claim that their Packet Number Difference (PDN) based approach for stepping-stone detection can achieve provable upper bounds on the number of packets required to be monitored. However, the upper bound of the number of packets required is large, and therefore, quick detection of stepping stones remains a challenge.
Current stepping stone detection approaches can be classified into three types: timing based [2, 3, 4] , packet number based [5, 6] and Round Trip Time (RTT) based [7, 8] . Unlike other types of approaches that use only Send packets, RTT based approaches use Send and Echo packets together in order to detect stepping stones. As a result, RTT based approaches can filter unsymmetrical Internet packets and chaff packets, and can be more resistant to network imperfections than any other type of approach. Yang et al. [8] proposed a Step Function approach to detect stepping stones, using the feature of RTT that changes small for normal connections but increases proportionally with the number of steppingstones in the chain. It has high accuracy of detecting a stepping stone when used together with EstimationBased RTT getting Algorithm (EBA) [10] . However this
Step function approach must monitor packets throughout all connections.
In this paper we propose a RTT based real-time stepping detection algorithm which needs just a small number of packets to be monitored and can also resist network imperfections. It uses the packet delay property with zero being the mean difference of the packet delay between two nodes in two directions. The results of the experiments and the simulations we conducted showed that this method can achieve a detection result within 20 seconds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give definitions and properties. We show the scheme in section 3 and some experimental results are given in section 4. Finally we summarize this paper in section 5.
Definitions and properties for packet delay
In this section we begin by defining some terms, and then present some properties for packet delay.
Definitions of packet delay
Because the data sent is normally echoed back for interactive connections, we give the definition of Round Trip Time (RTT) for interactive connections as follows. It is not easy to get the RTT in real-time with a high degree of precision because Echo packets have no obvious characteristic to identify correlated Send packets. However, there are several real-time RTT getting algorithms [8, 10] . We can directly use them to get the RTT sequence in real-time.
Definition 2 (RTT sequence Rtt a ) A RTT sequence Rtt a is a series of RTTs in chronological order obtained by RTT getting algorithm on connection i. Let Rtt a = (Rtt a (t a 0 ), Rtt a (t a 1 ), …Rtt a (t a n ), ….), where Rtt a (t a n ) (n ≥ 1) is the nth RTT got by RTT getting algorithm for interactive connection a. t a n is the arrival epoch of Echo packet by which to get the nth RTT on connection a.
Definition 3 (Upstream and Downstream Connection) We say that connection a is an upstream connection of connection b, and b is a downstream connection of a when a and b are in the same connection chain, and Rtt a > Rtt b around the same time.
Because the upstream connections have more relay nodes than their downstream connections, for relayed same Send packet, the RTT for upstream connections is larger than the RTT for their downstream. Proof. The packet delay consists of four components, including processing delay, queuing delay, transmission delay and propagation delay [11] . Given a packet of size p that traverses a path of h hops, each link of capacity Ci and propagation delay δi, the propagation and transmission delay can be written as: 
Properties of packet delay
T
Bidirectional Delay Comparison scheme for Stepping Stone detection
Based on the Theorem 2, we designed the Bidirectional Delay Comparison scheme (BDC) for stepping stone detection. To begin with, we will describe the frame of our scheme and then introduce related RTT getting algorithms and provide details of the Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm.
Frame of Bidirectional Delay Comparison scheme
Our Bidirectional Delay Comparison scheme is designed to be run at the network gateway node or as an independent process at the stepping-stone hosts. It examines the interactive connections and demonstrates that if a connections pair is correlated connections in a connection chain
To be run in real-time, we designed a RTT pool which is composed of RTT sequence queues for different interactive connections as shown in Figure 2 . Initially, the suspected interactive connection traffic is analyzed by the RTT getting algorithm which outputs the RTTs to the RTT sequence queues in the RTT pool in real-time. The Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm will get a pair of RTT sequences from the RTT pool, and then give the results if the pair of connections are related stepping stones links. 
RTT getting algorithm
Since the RTT getting algorithm is closely related to our BDC scheme, we have to look at the current real-time Yang et al. [8] proposed Conservative and Greedy algorithms which can obtain RTT by matching Send packets and Echo packets logically. But they are based on the assumption that every Send packet matches one Echo packet. However there are packet merges, packet drops, packet retransmissions etc. in real internet traffic, which means the packet mapping information has no organization. Therefore, Conservative and Greedy algorithms have a low accuracy in getting RTT.
Estimation-Based RTT getting Algorithm (EBA) [10] proposed by Li et al., calculates RTT estimation value first by the first-order linear recursive filter, which is motivated from the current TCP RTT estimation mechanism. It then finds the corresponding Echo packet whose real RTT is closest to the RTT estimating values. This means it is not dependent on the packet mapping information. Packets merge, drop, or retransmit, the chaff-perturbation can change the packets orderliness (mapping information), but cannot change the RTT properties that the occurrences of RTT for a connection chain are more like Poisson distribution [9] . So the accuracy of EBA algorithm can't be affected by network imperfection and chaff-perturbation. The probability analysis in EBA showed that EBA can have the same accuracy with SDBA [9] which is an offline RTT getting algorithm and has an accuracy rate higher than 97% in experiments. This means that we prefer to use the EBA algorithm to get RTTs in real-time.
Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm
The Bidirectional Delay Comparison algorithm is responsible for the output of the result if two connections are related stepping stones. These can be gotten through comparison of corresponding RTT sequences.
To be run efficiently, our BDC algorithm will do preprocessing prior to comparing. The pre-processing activities include the start comparing points finding and upstream connection judging. The start comparing points are two elements in the two separate RTT sequences. If two connections are related stepping stones links, RTTs got from the two connections should occur around the same time. As a result we selected the start comparing points where the interval of the two points was smaller than the value of the bigger RTT of the two points. If the start comparing points can not be found even with enough data, then the points shouldn't be stepping stone links. We also needed to judge which connection was going to be the upstream link if there are stepping stones links by comparing the value of RTT of the start comparing points. According to definition 3, the one with the bigger RTT value will be the upstream connection. Otherwise, the comparing pair should be current Rtt b element with next Rtt a element. Then we repeat above comparing procedure until every RTT sequence has at least k number of elements being compared. We then calculated the checking rate as the times being judged stepping stones pair divides k. If the checking rate is higher then 75%, we consider the two connections as stepping stone links according to Theorem 2. If the checking rate is lower than 25%, we do not consider the two connections as stepping stone links. Otherwise, further comparisons would need to be made.
The BDC algorithm is presented in Table 1 .
Parameters Discussion
There are two parameters in our scheme: k and θ . k is the number of RTTs we should compare before the result is returned. The smaller the k, the quicker the response will be. But the bigger the k, the lower the accuracy will be. θ should be bigger than 2*( standard deviation of |T ab -T ba | as described in Theorem 2. In addition, we knew that RTT ab = T ab + T ab , and the standard deviation of |T ab -T ba| should not be bigger than the standard deviation of RTT ab . So we let θ > 2*(standard deviation of RTT ab ). In our experiments, θ was set to 30 microseconds and k was set to 10, which worked well.
Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the responsiveness and accuracy of the BDC scheme using experiments. We built two connection chains on Internet by SSH from host H1 and host H2 separately, with both passing through host H3, then to hosts H4, H5, H6, and finally connecting to host H7. And H4 and H6 are in same network segment, as shown on Figure 3 . The other hosts located in different area of Melbourne. We captured the SSH packets and applied EBA and BDC algorithms concurrently at host H4 when all the connection chains were built. Let SSH connections between H3 and H4, H4 and H5, H5 and H6 and H6 to H7 started by H1 as connection a1, b1, c1 and d1 (these are correlated connections). Similarly, the connections in another connection chain started by H2 are supposed to be a2, b2, c2and d2, which are also correlated connections. Since H4 and H6 are in the same network segment, we have eight connections' packet data by capturing data at H4. After the two connection chains have been built, we entered commands at the terminal of H1 and H2 by quick speed concurrently for about 3 minutes. Then we checked if our BDC algorithm could identify correlated connections and uncorrelated connections quickly. To give comparable results, we let the EBA algorithm output the RTT sequence continuously even if the BDC had output the detection results. Our experiments showed that the BDC scheme output the detection results for every connection pair correctly within 20 seconds. Two sample results as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 , with the X-axis representing the Figure 4 shows that the BDC scheme found that a1 and d1 are correlated stepping stone connections in 9 seconds. Figure 5 shows that the BDC scheme found that a1 and d2 are uncorrelated stepping stone connections in 13 seconds.
To estimate the accuracy of the BDC scheme, we then ran EBA and BDC algorithm continually off-line which means it will continually give the judging result with every k RTT. We then combined all the results, with a total of 133 judging results for stepping stones pairs. Only 4 of them had been judged a non-stepping stone pair, which means the false negative (stepping-stone connections erroneously flagged as non-stepping stones connections) rate is 3%. In total, there are 157 judging results for non-stepping stones pairs, and only 1 of them had been judged a non-stepping stone pair. This means a false positive (non-stepping-stone connections erroneously flagged as stepping stones connections) rate is 0.6% as shown in Table 2 . 
Conclusion
Quick responsiveness is still a challenge for tracing back or blocking stepping stone attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel quick-response real-time stepping stones detection scheme which is based on packet delay properties with the mean difference of the packet delay between two nodes in two directions equaling zero. The results of the experiments and the simulations we conducted showed that this method can achieve detection results within 20 seconds. This is quicker than the IPD approach which was the only approach taking responsiveness into consideration. Our experiments also demonstrate that false positives and false negatives are no more than 3% which indicates it can be resistant to normal network imperfection as well.
